The joint session nearly collapsed over guide compensation.
Vendors refused to absorb a flat fee.
Guides refused to be told to survive on tips.
The association marketing reserve could not pay unlimited commissions.
Pendo proposed a capped coordination fee inside an optional, disclosed group package, with an association contribution for routing work.
Lillian set the consumer rule.
“The visitor must see the package total and the components before ordering. Internal revenue splits can be separate, but the existence of guide compensation cannot be hidden inside an unexplained food price.”
Salim suggested the phrase:
**Guide coordination / group logistics.**
Mama Saada worried it would look like the guide was charging people personally.
“Then describe the service,” Rehema said.
They wrote the package lines in plain language.
The base food price remained independent.
Route access was harder.
A purely random lottery could send a large group to a stall too small to serve it safely.
Kassim created capacity bands. Within each band, eligible vendors rotated through a public draw. Hygiene suspension could temporarily remove a stall. Safety restrictions could override placement.
Kileo wanted discretion for special VIP groups.
Halima rejected secret exceptions.
The compromise required any special accessibility or pre-booked capacity override to carry a visible reason in the route log.
They designed the refund process too.
Visitors from the pilot period would have thirty days to submit a claim where an undisclosed differential could be supported by a receipt or other payment proof.
They would not have to prove nationality, wealth, or “tourist type.”
Association reserve would pay validated refunds first. Internal allocation between vendor, guide system, and association could happen later.
That protected small vendors from becoming the only source of compensation for a system the association had designed.
The complaint dashboard would show: received, under review, refunded, not substantiated, appeal, unresolved.
No names.
Before signature, Pendo tested three hypothetical transactions through the charter.
A walk-in bought only food.
A group selected reserved seating.
Another group selected seating, juice, and guide coordination.
Every total could be reconstructed from the public menu.
Then she tested a vendor refusing the optional package system.
Its route eligibility remained unchanged except for ordinary capacity, hygiene, and safety requirements.
Kileo watched.
“This creates more paperwork.”
Halima replied, “And less argument.”
Then Kileo offered Rehema a job.
“Association compliance director. We need someone credible.”
The salary was significantly higher than her ferry-clerk pay.
Mama Saada privately urged her to accept.
“Then someone sensible will be inside.”
Rehema shook her head.
“My mother owns a major stall in the system. If I become the pricing gatekeeper, the next complaint starts with another conflict.”
“You can recuse.”
“Sometimes. But visitor information can stay independent without controlling vendor prices or routes.”
She proposed an open hiring process for the compliance role instead.
Kileo looked annoyed but eventually agreed.
The charter passed.
The first route draw happened publicly.
Stall IDs went into a transparent drum within capacity bands.
Saada Seafood received a strong slot.
Then Jalia—the vendor that had openly challenged the old system—drew the adjacent position.
No guide veto.
Fatuma also received a good position later in the rotation. Reform was not punishment for vendors who had supported the previous scheme.
The refund desk processed three claims the next morning.
One claim was rejected because the customer had received a fully itemized package and agreed to it.
Rehema was pleased by that result.
A fair complaint system could not become an automatic machine for punishing vendors.
The charter included a sixty-day review date. Metrics would include refund volume, route concentration, package opt-out, consented aggregate vendor-income ranges, guide earnings, and unresolved complaints.
Kileo wanted unresolved cases hidden from the public dashboard.
Halima refused.
“If we hide unfinished work, we recreate the problem.”
The review clause passed.
Rehema returned to the ferry office wearing the same badge she had started with.
No new title.
No direct control over stall prices.
The sixty-day review clause was one of the final safeguards added to the charter. Lillian argued that a beautifully written rule could still fail once the tourist season became busy. The review would track route concentration, refund outcomes, package opt-outs, guide earnings, and unresolved complaints using aggregated data. Rehema insisted that unresolved cases remain visible. Kileo worried the dashboard would advertise failure. Halima answered that hiding unfinished work would simply recreate the old culture of claiming success because no formal appeals had been counted.
A public charter, a neutral route process, and a refund desk were now operating without requiring her to become their permanent boss.